The Russian-American New START Treaty expires on February 5. After this date, Moscow and Washington will find themselves without any arms control agreements or negotiation processes for the first time in more than half a century. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council and leader of the United Russia party, spoke to Kommersant special correspondent Elena Chernenko about the importance of the New START Treaty and the future of nuclear deterrence. Medvedev signed the treaty during his presidency.
Q: What role did the New START Treaty play in Russian-American relations and in ensuring strategic stability? Did it live up to your expectations when it was signed?
Dmitry Medvedev: At a certain point in history, the New START Treaty generally fulfilled its main functions. It played a very positive role indeed. It maintained strategic stability and reduced the incentives for an arms race. It also ensured the necessary predictability in the field of strategic offensive weapons.
However, there were also some negative aspects. The Russian side had a number of complaints against the American side regarding specific provisions of the treaty. The Joe Biden administration also took steps we consider destructive. These contradicted the fundamental principles and understandings set out in the preamble to the New START Treaty. Without their agreement during negotiations, the treaty simply would not have been concluded. Ultimately, all this led to Russia suspending participation in New START in 2023. The problem lay not in the “quality” of the agreement itself, but in the irresponsible US approach to its implementation and to Russian-American relations as a whole.
Nevertheless, the New START Treaty remains significant, even though its implementation has been suspended. In recognition of this, both sides announced their intention to continue adhering to the treaty’s core quantitative limits until its expiry in February 2026.
Last September, our country proposed taking things even further. The Russian president put forward the constructive initiative of voluntarily preserving the parties’ commitment to the New START limits for at least one year after the treaty’s expiration. Our head of state emphasized that this measure could only be viable if the United States acted in a similar manner and did not take steps that would violate the current parity.
Implementing Russia’s initiative could significantly contribute to global security and the expansion of strategic dialogue with the United States. However, we have not yet received a substantive official response to our proposal from Washington.
Q: After signing the New START treaty, American officials (mostly from the Republican Party) repeatedly claimed that the agreement was disadvantageous to the United States. More recently, President Donald Trump stated that the document had “many weaknesses” and that “the negotiators did a poor job”. What is your opinion?
Dmitry Medvedev: I think Trump was referring to the American negotiators. He “loves” Barack Obama.
But I want to emphasize the main point. Washington’s decision to take steps that ultimately undermined the New START Treaty cannot be blamed on those who prepared and concluded it.
Both teams worked professionally during the negotiations. The agreement was complex and multi-layered. Each point was carefully checked. The final document was the result of genuine compromises that were equal and mutually beneficial. At the time, both sides acknowledged that this was a classic win-win situation.
As a direct participant in the events, I remember this well. As president of the country, I was for obvious reasons deeply involved in the negotiation process. I had a large number of telephone conversations on this issue with the US president at the time. I recall ironically referring to the well-known saying during one of these conversations: “If you want something done properly, you have to do it yourself.”
Of course, it was teamwork that made it possible. The efforts of all participants were truly impressive, as was the result achieved.
Therefore, the negativity that later accumulated around the New START Treaty was not related to the document itself, but to the subsequent behavior of the American side and the events surrounding the treaty.
If Washington eventually reassessed the terms of the treaty and decided that they had somehow “lost out” under New START, this speaks volumes about the high level of professionalism of the Russian negotiators, who managed to defend our national interests.Therefore, the negativity that later accumulated around the New START Treaty was not related to the document itself, but to the subsequent behavior of the American side and the events surrounding the treaty.
Q: As you mentioned, the United States has not yet responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal to keep the main numerical limits of the New START Treaty in place for a year after it expires. Do you see any potential for resuming cooperation with the United States in the field of arms control?
Dmitry Medvedev: The prospects for resuming fruitful cooperation with the US on arms control depend on favorable conditions being in place. First and foremost, Russian –American relations must be normalized to some extent. Under Biden, relations deteriorated to a level even worse than during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
We see that the new US administration is trying to reconsider the reckless and extremely risky approach of previous American administrations, which sought to inflict a “strategic defeat” on our country. This is a step in the right direction, but progress is slow. We are only at the beginning of the journey, and success is not yet guaranteed, especially since Donald Trump is inherently unstable in his political orientation.
Before we can build something new, we must ensure that it will not collapse under the weight of long-standing, unresolved problems.
Washington must demonstrate a commitment to respecting our fundamental security interests, both in words and in practice. We also need to ensure that it is capable of working with us on an equal footing to reduce the potential for conflict.
Therefore, it is premature to make optimistic predictions about the imminent resumption of a comprehensive and fruitful strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States that would include arms control issues.
This is especially the case given that problems in the strategic sphere continue to grow as a result of destabilizing actions by the United States. Consider, for example, the highly provocative ‘Golden Dome for America’ missile defense project. This project fundamentally contradicts the assertion of the inseparable link between offensive and defensive strategic weapons; a principle enshrined in the preamble to the New START Treaty.
We must also mention statements by American leaders suggesting they may resume full-scale nuclear testing. This would significantly complicate any potential strategic dialogue between Russia and the US.
There are many other negative examples.
However, there are clearly not enough positive signals coming from the American side. Notably, there has been no positive response to our post-START initiative. Therefore, to conclude briefly: it would be better to have no START-4 treaty than to have one that merely masks mutual distrust and provokes an arms race in other countries.
Q: How do you envisage the future of arms control after February 5? Do you foresee the possibility of multilateral agreements? Or will there be no regime at all and will the world face a new arms race between nuclear powers?
Dmitry Medvedev: First of all, we need to wait until February 5 to see if the US will respond meaningfully to the Russian initiative. In theory, looking at the calendar, there is still a small chance of positive decisions being made.
However, if we do not hear anything concrete from Washington, we will proceed based on the steps actually taken by the US. We are monitoring these steps closely and will continue to do so.
Russia is prepared for any eventuality.
Any new threats to our security will be dealt with promptly and decisively. There should be no doubt about that. This is especially pertinent given that new, highly powerful types of weapons are emerging alongside traditional strategic offensive weapons. All countries are engaged in this, including us, of course. You don’t have to look far for examples; consider the Burevestnik, Oreshnik, and Poseidon systems, for instance.
As for possible multilateral agreements, there is currently no queue of countries willing to discuss a new restrictive regime beyond Russia and the United States. Therefore, discussions on this topic are pointless. In fact, I would go further and say that I am confident the nuclear club will expand.
Q: How do you see the situation in the field of nuclear deterrence developing, given that there is no prospect of a rapid resumption of comprehensive strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States and no queue of countries willing to discuss a new restrictive regime in a broader format?
Dmitry Medvedev: Russia and the US still have considerable influence in this area as they are the countries with the largest nuclear capabilities. It is pointless to deny that the nuclear club is much broader today. There are recognized nuclear-weapon states under the NPT, and there are unofficial members who either acknowledge themselves as nuclear powers or do not. But everyone knows they are.
The situation is not without darkening clouds. It is getting worse because global instability and deepening contradictions in the world order are prompting some states to consider how to defend themselves most effectively. Some may conclude that acquiring nuclear weapons is the optimal path. Therefore, despite all the discontent surrounding this issue, I believe the nuclear club will continue to expand.
Several countries possess the technical capacity to develop military nuclear programs, and some are already conducting research in this field. Humanity may not want this, but let us be honest: no other method has been found to guarantee a state’s sovereignty and survival.
Without nuclear weapons, it is quite possible that our country would no longer exist. Whether that be the Soviet Union then or Russia today.
Overall, I am rather pessimistic about the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Q: Do you have any idea which new countries could join the nuclear club?
Dmitry Medvedev: I will only say that, according to open sources and intelligence data, many states are conducting research in this area. However, the boundary between peaceful and military nuclear energy is very fluid. Nevertheless, the emergence of new members of the nuclear club is quite likely.
Q: Will this stabilize or destabilize the situation?
Dmitry Medvedev: That’s a difficult question. On the one hand, the more countries that have nuclear potential, the less stable the situation becomes. After all, someone might decide to use nuclear weapons in a local conflict.
On the other hand, however, this will force states to consider the consequences of provoking certain conflicts.
Since you asked me about it: [Western] Europeans, and under the Biden administration, Americans, have constantly forced us to make tough decisions. And these provocations continue. Remember the attack on the Russian president’s residence at the end of the year using a large number of unmanned aerial vehicles? This could actually have been grounds for a retaliatory strike involving special weapons.
Games of this kind are extremely dangerous.
It is impossible to say unequivocally what impact military nuclear weapons have on human existence. On the one hand, they create enormous tension; on the other, they put dangerous minds at ease.
Q: What measures, apart from the arms control treaty system which is becoming obsolete, could reduce the risk of nuclear war in your opinion?
Dmitry Medvedev: We have always taken a comprehensive approach. At its core is a set of fundamental principles that nuclear powers must follow: equal and indivisible security, respect for each other’s vital interests, and the resolution of contradictions that could lead to military confrontation. Arms control plays a secondary role. It is a tool that helps implement agreements in practice, through limits and inspections. But it is not a panacea.
If we are not heard, we will act proportionately to restore parity. Or we will create something fundamentally new, something that will sober up those with dangerous intentions.
That is why the successful work of the Russian defense-industrial complex acts as a tranquilizer for Russia’s enemies.
This article was first published by Kommersant, and was translated and edited by the RT team.