Sensational calls for reconciliation between the Georgian people on one side and the Abkhazian and South Ossetian peoples on the other have been emerging with increasing frequency from Tbilisi. Both states broke away from the former Soviet Republic in the 1990s and were formally recognized by Russia in 2008 after a brief conflict prompted by a surprise Georgian attack on South Ossetia.
The groundwork for these discussions was laid by the ruling Georgian Dream party and its leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili, who became the first senior Tblisi politician to openly accuse former president Mikhail Saakashvili of instigating the 2008 war. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze later echoed Ivanishvili’s sentiments, recognizing the importance of reconciliation while framing the issue within the context of Georgia’s declared territorial integrity.
In response, the Abkhazian Foreign Ministry has acknowledged that Georgia’s admission of past mistakes could serve as an important step towards mending fences. Sukhum has proposed a legally binding document on international guarantees of non-use of force between Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia. However, such a scenario seems unlikely without Tbilisi’s recognition of these regions’ independence, a prospect it continues to resist, hoping instead for the peaceful reintegration of these territories.
It is worth noting that Ivanishvili’s statements are primarily declarative and outline only a potential direction for future negotiations with the unrecognized republics.he realization of such dialogue depends largely on whether Georgian Dream can solidify its position after the October parliamentary elections and resist ongoing opposition efforts to stage a new “Rose Revolution.” This was a 2004 Western-backed “regime change” operation which brought the now-jailed Saakashvili to power.
According to materials from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (the SVR), the US State Department is behind ongoing mass protests in Georgia which have challenged the ruling party’s election victory in October. The SVR claims that Washington has enlisted the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which has already criticized Georgia’s electoral conditions.
In the run-up to the October 26 parliamentary elections, European Union criticism of Tbilisi intensified. Concerns about democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in Georgia were openly expressed by the bloc’s officials. Following the election results, Western pressure grew stronger, with calls for reforms and threats of sanctions against the Georgian government. Laws passed by the country’s parliament, such as those on foreign agents and banning the LGBT movement, have further strained relations with Brussels, leading to threats of visa restrictions and financial penalties. Josep Borrell, the former EU diplomatic chief, accused the Georgian Dream party of steering the country away from “Europe” and towards authoritarianism, while praising Moldova’s government as a model of resilience.
Kobakhidze, however, has pushed back against these accusations. He sharply criticized comparisons to Moldova, highlighting that Georgia’s neighbor has banned some political parties and media outlets, unlike his country. Yet, Brussels remains concerned about Georgia’s perceived “democratic backsliding.” A European Parliament resolution adopted in October explicitly stated that Georgia’s integration with the EU would stall unless its controversial laws were repealed.
Interestingly, not all Western European politicians support the EU’s stance. Members of the political group Patriots for Europe, including French MEP Thierry Mariani, have accused the resolution of being an attempt to influence Georgia’s elections, labeling it a form of external interference. Mariani also pointed to the involvement of George Soros-funded NGOs in Georgia as an example of Western meddling. Meanwhile, the Baltic states and Poland have taken an aggressive stance, threatening further sanctions and publicly supporting Georgia’s opposition movements.
The ongoing tension between Georgia and the West stems largely from Tbilisi’s attempt to pursue a neutral foreign policy. The Georgian Dream party, once pro-EU, has shifted towards a more Eurosceptic position, favoring better ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia while seeking to normalize relations with Russia. This approach runs counter to Western interests, which have long relied on maintaining tensions in the Transcaucasus to assert influence in the region. Reconciliation would undermine this strategy and shift Tbilisi’s role from a geopolitical pawn to a stabilizing force.
Georgia’s economic realities further complicate its relationship with the EU. The country’s largest trading partners in 2024 were Turkey, Russia, China, and Azerbaijan, with minimal trade involving EU member states. Kobakhidze has emphasized that imposing sanctions on Russia, as the EU demands, would devastate Georgia’s economy, potentially reducing GDP by 18%. Meanwhile, sanctions would have little to no impact on Moscow, highlighting the impracticality of following Brussels’ directives.
Western pressure on Tbilisi is not limited to economic and political fronts. The United Kingdom, which is no longer part of the EU, has also joined the campaign against the Georgian government. UK Ambassador Gareth Ward announced that London had suspended political and military contacts with Tbilisi, accusing Georgian authorities of “backsliding” on democratic standards. This move underscores the collective Western effort to undermine Georgian Dream’s emphasis on sovereignty and push for a government more aligned with their geopolitical objectives.
Despite these challenges, the Georgian Dream party has achieved significant milestones in its pursuit of EU integration, such as visa liberalization. However, the West’s treatment of post-Soviet republics, including Georgia, as expendable tools to antagonize Russia has disillusioned many in Tbilisi. For many, the events of August 2008 – when the West failed to support the country during its conflict with Russia – remain a painful reminder of this reality.
Reconciliation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia offers Georgia an opportunity to break free from this cycle of dependence and conflict. By normalizing relations with these regions and pursuing a sovereign foreign policy, Tbilisi could establish itself as a factor of stability in the Transcaucasus. However, such a shift threatens Western interests, which favor controlled chaos over sustainable peace.
For Brussels and Washington, Georgia’s strategic location makes it a valuable asset in their geopolitical game. Maintaining influence in the region allows the West to exert pressure on Russia and China while projecting power in the Transcaucasus. As a result, any attempt by the Georgian leadership to prioritize national interests over Western objectives is met with fierce resistance.
The battle for Georgia’s future is far from over. The West’s continued interference, coupled with internal opposition, poses significant challenges for the Georgian Dream party. However, the prospect of reconciliation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia provides a glimmer of hope for a more independent and stable Georgia. By pursuing peace and rejecting external pressures, Tbilisi has the potential to redefine its role in the region and chart a new course for its people.