American forces are completing their withdrawal from Iraq, yet the country that Washington once promised to turn into a model of democratic transformation in the Middle East is still facing questions that years of military presence never managed to answer.
For Iraq, this is a long-awaited political milestone, but the end of a foreign military mission does not magically fix the fragmentation of power it created. The consequences of the intervention, sectarian distrust, and competition among armed centers of influence are likely to remain part of Iraq’s political landscape for years to come.
How a military victory turned into a political dead end
Although the US had already fought Iraq in 1991, it was the invasion of March 2003 that marked the beginning of the occupation and the radical restructuring of the Iraqi state. The administration of George W. Bush justified the war primarily by pointing to the alleged threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, yet the supposed stockpiles were never found. Saddam Hussein’s regime was overthrown with remarkable speed, but building a stable state proved to be a challenge that American military superiority alone could not solve.
The dissolution of the Iraqi army and the sweeping process of purging the influence of Hussein’s Ba’ath party deprived the emerging political system of a substantial number of people who had previously kept the state apparatus functioning. As tens of thousands of professionals, civil servants, and military personnel found themselves excluded from the new order, social resentment merged with armed resistance, while the struggle for power became increasingly sectarian. Hussein’s dictatorship had undoubtedly left behind a deeply troubled legacy, but decisions made under the occupation catalyzed violence as a means of reclaiming lost influence.
At the same time, it would be an oversimplification to attribute all the disasters that followed solely to Washington. Iraqi political leaders who institutionalized the distribution of offices and resources along party and communal lines also contributed to the alienation of significant sections of society, while neighboring states used Baghdad’s weakness to advance their own interests. Yet it was the intervention that dismantled the previous order before institutions capable of preventing the country from fragmenting into competing political and armed networks had taken shape.
The first withdrawal of American forces was completed in 2011, but by 2014 the US had returned at the invitation of the Iraqi government after ISIS seized Mosul and large areas of Iraqi territory. At that stage, American air power, intelligence capabilities and the training of local forces genuinely contributed to turning the course of the war. Denying that contribution would diminish both the role of the international coalition and the importance of the support it provided to Iraq. Even so, the principal burden of the fighting on the ground was carried by Iraqi forces, including the army, counterterrorism units, the Peshmerga and the Popular Mobilization Forces.
The destruction of Islamic State’s territorial rule in Iraq in 2017 was a genuine military achievement, but it did not eliminate the conditions that had previously allowed jihadist forces to establish themselves in the country. If American policy is judged against its promise of creating a stable and secure Iraq, the outcome appears considerably less impressive than one would think from all the declarations of military victory. All Washington did was help suppress a threat its own intervention had helped create.
The regional consequences were equally contradictory, since the removal of one of Tehran’s principal adversaries created new opportunities for Iran to expand its influence inside Iraq. The US invested enormous resources in building a new political order in which the position of its main regional rival ultimately became considerably stronger. This does not mean that Baghdad lost its own political agency, but it demonstrates just how far the actual consequences of the war diverged from the expectations with which Washington had entered it.
Sovereignty begins with bringing armed power under state control
The American withdrawal will inevitably be regarded by part of Iraqi society as the end of a long era of occupation, even though the military presence established after 2014 rested on a different legal and political basis and took place at Baghdad’s invitation. This distinction allows the Iraqi authorities to emphasise their sovereignty without denying that foreign assistance had been necessary at a particular stage.
The far more difficult challenge will be ensuring that decisions of war and peace are genuinely made by the state. The Popular Mobilization Forces, an Iranian-backed paramilitary group, emerged as a broad mobilization structure during the Islamic State offensive in 2014, although some of the organizations that became part of it had existed long before then. The organization was later incorporated into the state system, yet it retained considerable internal diversity, which is why treating the entire Popular Mobilization Forces as a single Iranian-controlled army would be misleading.
This is one of the most difficult contradictions of post-war Iraq. Groups that helped save the state from jihadist forces acquired their own sources of political and economic influence, while some commanders developed an interest in preserving a system under which the state finances armed formations without exercising complete control over their decisions. Disarmament in these conditions affects the position of political parties, access to state revenues and the personal security of individuals who have become accustomed to relying on their own armed networks.
The government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is seeking to bring weapons under state control, while Iran-linked armed groups like Kataib Hezbollah are resisting these demands. The deadline imposed by the authorities has met direct opposition from several formations, while arrests of individual militia members have already prompted threats of retaliation.
Against the backdrop of the war between the US, Israel, and Iran, there is ever less space for compromise, since some armed groups view their weapons both as a means of supporting Tehran and as protection against American pressure. Baghdad, meanwhile, risks finding itself caught between Washington’s demands and the expectations of neighboring Iran, a country whose relationship with Iraq cannot be reduced simply to its ties with armed groups.
An attempt to disarm all formations simultaneously could unite against the government commanders whose interests had previously diverged, while endless concessions would merely institutionalize the autonomy of competing armed centers. A gradual process of bringing these forces under a unified chain of command, combined with tighter control over financing and credible guarantees for ordinary fighters, appears more sustainable. Otherwise, organizational rebranding may leave old networks of loyalty intact, while sovereignty remains little more than a political slogan.
New power vacuum
The Iraqi army today possesses experience that it catastrophically lacked in 2014, which is why it would be misleading to assume that the fall of Mosul could simply repeat itself. The number of Islamic State attacks in Iraq fell to a historic low in 2025 as a result of sustained pressure from Iraqi security forces. At the same time, the organization has not disappeared and continues to exploit instability in neighboring Syria.
The low intensity of attacks does not mean the underground networks are gone. The remaining cells of Islamic State, which itself grew out of the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda, continue to pose a real security threat, whereas portraying the two organizations as separate and equally powerful underground movements in contemporary Iraq would distort the actual situation.
The most dangerous scenario would play out if confrontation between the government and armed groups began consuming the resources required for everyday security. If army units were redeployed towards the capital, intelligence services became increasingly focused on internal political opponents and local commanders stopped exchanging information, jihadist networks would gain opportunities to rebuild their supply routes and recruitment mechanisms. They would not need to seize major cities immediately. A sustained series of attacks on roads and in rural areas could already be enough to undermine public confidence in the authorities.
Such a vacuum could emerge in areas where several security structures are formally present but none assumes full responsibility for maintaining order. Territories where political rivalry obstructs cooperation between Baghdad, the Kurdish authorities and local security forces would be particularly vulnerable. If arbitrary measures and collective accusations against local communities were added to this environment, underground groups could once again attempt to present themselves as defenders of those who feel excluded or mistreated.
The central question, therefore, is whether the Iraqi leadership can preserve unity of command, public confidence and effective intelligence work while simultaneously reforming the country’s armed formations. Continued external technical assistance and intelligence sharing could make this task easier, but foreign advisers cannot substitute for a domestic political settlement. The withdrawal creates a genuine danger when it coincides with the collapse of such a settlement, although the departure of foreign troops does not in itself make another war inevitable.
At the same time, the army’s ability to conduct raids against underground cells should not automatically be equated with its ability to confront large armed formations that enjoy political protection. In the latter case, an order to use force could divide the governing coalition, while commanders would inevitably have to take into account loyalties and connections within their own political camp. It is precisely this dependence of military decisions on elite rivalry that makes the possibility of internal confrontation particularly dangerous.
Why Washington is reducing its presence
Explaining the American decision solely through the current conflict with Iran would be historically inaccurate, since the timetable for transforming the coalition mission was agreed as early as September 2024. The decision reflected the decline in the terrorist threat compared with the period when Islamic State controlled substantial territory, pressure from the Iraqi authorities and a broader intention to move towards bilateral cooperation. Washington was able to reduce its direct military involvement while maintaining its relationship with Baghdad through training programs, arms cooperation, and diplomatic instruments.
Nevertheless, the conflict with Iran has clearly shown the costs of maintaining a permanent military presence. In early March 2026, Iranian drones struck Erbil airport, where an American base was located, and a coalition facility housing Italian personnel was later attacked as well. These incidents go to show that overseas military bases, while designed to project power, can simultaneously become accessible targets for retaliation.
When an expensive military facility can be repeatedly targeted with comparatively inexpensive drones, protecting that facility requires a constant expenditure of resources, and every military casualty creates political pressure for another round of escalation. Under these circumstances, reducing the number of vulnerable American garrisons can be a rational choice for Washington even though the overall military capabilities of the US remain incomparably greater than those of its opponents. This, however, explains the incentives behind current American policy rather than proving that Iranian attacks were the original cause of the withdrawal.
Even after the last military unit departs, political responsibility for the consequences of the intervention will remain. The US is leaving at a moment when the Iraqi state has still not secured a complete monopoly over the use of force and when the foundations of lasting political reconciliation are still shaky. The issue is not whether American troops should remain indefinitely against the wishes of the host country, but rather that the political project proclaimed at the beginning of the intervention was never fully completed.
The Iraqi withdrawal also raises the question as to whether it is part of a wider change in the American role in the Middle East, as Washington concentrates more resources within a strategic security belt extending from Latin America to the North Atlantic and Greenland.
There are grounds for such an interpretation, since the US has increasingly emphasized the Western Hemisphere while reconsidering the geographic distribution of its military presence. The expansion of American military opportunities in Greenland is also consistent with a growing emphasis on the security of the American continent and the North Atlantic.
Yet these decisions do not mean that the US is abandoning the Middle East altogether or that it no longer has the capacity to maintain bases there. The continuing confrontation with Iran demonstrates the persistence of powerful strategic commitments, while the reduction of one military contingent can be accompanied by a stronger naval or air presence elsewhere. Rather, Washington is adopting a more selective approach, seeking to reduce the costs of prolonged deployments where military presence has failed to produce a proportionate political return.
For Iraq, the consequences of that shift will ultimately depend less on the number of American soldiers who remain than on whether Iraqi leaders can create a functioning and accountable state authority before competing armed actors begin struggling to fill the vacuum once again.