Since the end of 2025, the security situation in South Sudan, the youngest country in Africa, has sharply deteriorated, raising fears of a new civil war. Jonglei State, located near the Ethiopian border, has been particularly hard-hit by violence. The renewed fighting threatens to undermine the 2018 peace agreement between the government and opposition forces.
Intense clashes have erupted between the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) and the opposition factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) across Jonglei State, Upper Nile State, and Unity State, as well as in parts of Equatoria.
Reports indicate that between December 1, 2025 and January 23, 2026, at least 200 people lost their lives due to the conflict in Jonglei State, including over 40 civilians. The United Nations reports that around 280,000 people have been displaced in Jonglei State alone due to the resurgence of hostilities and airstrikes that began on December 29, 2025. This mass displacement has put more than 450,000 children at risk of acute malnutrition.
The start of hostilities
In late December 2025 and early January 2026, SPLM/A-IO, alongside allied forces primarily composed of Nuer militias known as the White Army, seized several key cities and government positions in northern Jonglei State, forcing the SSPDF to retreat. Shortly thereafter, the opposition called for a march on Juba. On January 25, the SSPDF announced the launch of Operation Enduring Peace and ordered the evacuation of civilians and UN Mission in South Sudan personnel from Nyirol, Uror, and Akobo counties, designating them as combat zones.
The main clashes erupted on January 26 on the outskirts of the heavily populated city of Yuai in eastern Jonglei State. While the SSPDF managed to capture some villages, the opposition has retained control over the city. By early February, the SSPDF had claimed “victory” and recaptured certain positions; however, the SPLM/A-IO described this as a “tactical withdrawal” to regroup.
Both sides employed heavy weaponry, including tanks, during these confrontations; during the course of combat, huts were burned and weapons seized.
This latest surge of violence comes amid preparations for the country’s first-ever general parliamentary elections, planned for December 2026. It was preceded by a series of contentious decisions by South Sudan President Salva Kiir, including the arrest of South Sudan First Vice President Riek Machar in March 2025 on charges of treason and involvement in killings linked to the takeover of an SSPDF base by the White Army, as well as the dismissal of Machar’s wife, Angelina Teny, from her post as Minister of Interior in early 2026.
Machar’s supporters view these developments as a blatant violation of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), particularly its provisions regarding power-sharing. They argue that President Kiir’s moves to delay the adoption of a permanent constitution and failure to conduct a national census bolster his position and exacerbate tensions with the opposition.
When independence doesn’t bring peace
As of 2025, South Sudan is the youngest, and, according to certain data, the poorest country in the world. South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011, following a referendum held in 2005. It was initially expected that the move toward independence would bring the country prosperity. However, internal divisions quickly escalated into an armed confrontation. In December 2013, President Salva Kiir accused First Vice President Riek Machar of attempting a coup. This resulted in a civil war.
The conflict flared up in the capital, Juba, and rapidly spread to other regions. Soon, it evolved into an ethnic conflict: the Dinka people, loyal to Kiir, clashed with the Nuer people, who supported Machar. Both groups belong to the Nilotic ethnic group and make up the largest segments of South Sudan’s population (the Dinka comprise about 35% and the Nuer around 15% of the country’s population).
The conflict was marked by widespread atrocities, including mass killings, ethnic cleansing, and sexual violence, and became one of the most devastating crises in the region’s history. According to UN estimates, by 2018, the war had claimed around 400,000 lives, displaced 4 million people, and triggered a large-scale humanitarian disaster. The nation’s fledgling economy was left paralyzed, and its infrastructure lay in ruins due to the fighting.
In September 2018, the R-ARCSS agreement was signed in Khartoum, Sudan. It aimed to establish a coalition government, a power-sharing model, and a 36-month transitional period leading up to elections. The agreement also included mechanisms for disarmament, demilitarization, and integrating opposition forces into the national army.
However, the implementation of the agreement stalled: as of 2026, the key conditions of the agreement, such as establishing a permanent constitution and conducting a national census, remain unfulfilled.
The events of the past year have intensified the crisis. In March, Machar was detained and placed under house arrest, and on January 19, 2026, Kiir dismissed Machar’s wife, Angelina Teny, from her position as Minister of Interior.
Teny is a key figure in the country’s politics; she previously served as Minister of Defense and Veteran Affairs (2020–2023), and as State Minister of Energy and Mining (2005–2010). Her dismissal dealt a significant blow to the 2018 peace agreement, given that her ministerial position was established as part of the power-sharing arrangement between the government and the opposition.
The opposition views these actions as a deliberate violation of the R-ARCSS provisions regarding power-sharing, leading SPLM/A-IO factions to launch offensives across various regions of the country. Forces led by General Simon Gatwech Dual, commander of the Kitgwang faction of SPLM/A-IO, has seized the town of Pajut and army positions in Akobo county. On February 2, 2026, Gatwech officially declared his withdrawal from the Port Sudan Peace Agreement, which he had signed with the South Sudanese government a year earlier (in February 2025). He accused President Salva Kiir of sabotaging peace efforts and announced a return to open hostilities.
Machar’s supporters in the opposition also insist on meeting the preconditions for elections, which include releasing political prisoners, reforming the electoral commission, and ensuring security guarantees. Opposition leaders argue that the ongoing process is rigged in favor of the government.
Commanders within the SPLM/A-IO have threatened to advance on the capital, Juba, which is currently protected by the SSPDF and a contingent of Ugandan troops sent to aid government forces. The opposition accuses Uganda of encouraging interethnic clashes and creating the risk of involving neighboring states, thereby transforming a local crisis into a regional one.
In turn, the authorities have accused the rebels of using cattle theft raids as a means to destabilize the situation. The fragmentation of the conflict is exacerbated by the emergence of new armed groups, such as the South Sudan Rescue Operation and the Red Belt Group, although the opposition movement has historically relied on the White Army for military support.
What is the White Army?
The term “White Army” refers to community-based youth militias organized along sectional and clan lines. The name derives from the white ash that Nuer herders traditionally apply to their skin and faces in cattle camps in order to protect against insects.
The main occupation of the Nuer people living in the greater Upper Nile region is cattle herding, and the primary role of the White Army is self-defense: safeguarding herds and territories from raids and looting, especially when central authority is perceived more as a threat than a guarantee of protection.
In these formations, authority flows from communities rather than from political leaders. These decentralized armed groups are organized along clan lines, following the longstanding self-defense traditions of the Nuer people. The White Army has participated in conflicts alongside the opposition since the 1990s, including in the civil war of 2013-2018 and the skirmishes of 2025-2026, but it operates autonomously.
A notable example is the start of the civil war in 2013. In December 2013, the mass killing of Nuer civilians in Juba transformed a conflict previously driven by political rivalries into an ethnic struggle. For the Nuer, December 2013, with its mass killings and displacements, became the symbol of an existential threat. It’s worth noting that the White Army receives substantial informational and financial support from Nuer diasporas in North America, Europe, and East Africa.
In a lawsuit filed against Machar, the South Sudanese government has reiterated its familiar claim that the White Army is an armed wing of the SPLM/A-IO acting under Machar’s orders. This assertion aims to depict the mobilization of the Nuer clans as a conspiracy organized by the opposition.
However, the White Army is a community-based militia rather than a permanent militia or an insurgent group with centralized command. This makes it challenging to include the White Army in peace agreements involving the elites. The opposition’s attacks have largely been carried out by White Army fighters seeking revenge for cattle raids; their motivations only partially align with Machar’s political objectives. As for Machar, he benefits from the White Army’s mobilization, but does not control it.
Humanitarian catastrophe
The resurgence of hostilities has had devastating humanitarian consequences: hundreds of people have died and hundreds of thousands have been displaced. Many have sought refuge in swampy areas without access to food or medical care. Displacement has been exacerbated by the South Sudanese army ordering the evacuation of all civilians and UN personnel, as well as the staff of other charitable organizations, from three counties in Jonglei State ahead of military operations against opposition forces. Humanitarian missions have also been affected; on the night of February 1-2, several staff members from Doctors Without Borders (MSF) went missing following an airstrike on a hospital in Jonglei State.
Cattle raiding, traditionally used for settling scores, paralyzes the local economy. Natural disasters such as floods and droughts, outbreaks of cholera, and the aftermath of the war in neighboring Sudan have further worsened the situation. According to the UN, in mid-2025, over 1.9 million people were internally displaced, while 2.3 million refugees sought safety in neighboring countries. Approximately 9.3 million people (out of a total population of around 11 to 13 million) are in need of humanitarian aid, with 7.7 million facing food shortages during dry months and 2.3 million children at risk of acute malnutrition. Women and children suffer the most due to rising incidents of sexual violence, child labor, and education disruptions.
What’s next?
The crisis in South Sudan has implications for all of East Africa. Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan are grappling with an influx of refugees and widespread border crossings. Uganda’s support for Kiir strains relations with the opposition, which is linked to Sudan. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union are calling for dialogue, but meaningful progress remains elusive. Western partners, including the US and EU, have criticized delays in reforms and insist on adherence to the R-ARCSS.
Today, the 2018 peace agreement has effectively lost its practical relevance. The December elections, if they indeed take place, may only exacerbate existing tensions and provoke a return to a full-scale war. Without internal dialogue involving all parties to the conflict, coupled with effective diplomatic efforts and mediation, South Sudan faces an even greater humanitarian and political disaster, and risks becoming a perpetual source of instability in Africa.