Atomic origins

Interestingly, in 1930s, the time of many discoveries in the area of nuclear physics, Soviet advances in the field were on roughly the same level as that of European and American scientists. This was partially due to absence of secrecy in nuclear research, which was not regarded as something able to bring practical results in nearest future.

Several institutes studied atomic phenomena in Soviet Union, including Kharkov Physical Technical Institute, the Institute of Radium in Leningrad and nuclear lab at Leningrad Physical Technical Institute (LFTI). The latest gathered a number of young physicists, including the future head of the atomic project Ivan Kurchatov.

Before the war disrupted research, some 700 papers on atomic structure, strong forces, nuclear fission, neutrons and the possibility of chain nuclear reaction in uranium have been published in the country. This was despite officials both in the government and in the Academy of Sciences frowning on nuclear research, which promised little practical implementation in early 1930s.

Nevertheless by the time Nazi Germany attacked Soviet Union in 1941, there were quite a few brilliant nuclear scientists in the country, including future Nobel laureate Igor Tamm, Yuly Khariton – future chief constructor of the bomb itself, Yakov Zeldovich, Georgy Flerov, Konstantin Peterzhak, Anatoly Aleksandrov to name a few. However with the start of the war and occupation of large part of the European part of the country the work was halted. LFTI nuclear lab was evacuated with most of its crucial equipment left behind, and scientist were involved in defense projects. Kurchatov, for instance, was working on a system that protected warships from magnetic mines.

Intelligence trigger

Andrei Sakharov (left) with Igor Kurchatov 1958, Moscow

The work on “uranium problem” was re-enacted with governmental support in September 1942, after several pieces of information made Soviet leadership re-consider practical implications of nuclear research.

One was conspicuous lack of new papers on nuclear physics and any papers by western authors earlier interested in this field. Georgy Flerov wrote a letter to Cergey Kaftanov, the man in the government who supervised possible military application, to draw his attention to the fact, arguing that it meant that the research must has been classified.

At the same time reports gathered by both army intelligence and agents of NKVD, Soviet secret police, indicated that Britain and the USA intend to join their research on the use of uranium as a powerful explosive. For instance Moscow had detailed information on the work done by British MAUD Committee (Military Application of Uranium Detonation), which eventually led to starting the Manhattan Project.

And documents captured from a German officer in February 1942 proved Nazi had a similar project too. After consulting leading physicists like Ioffe, Semenov, Khlopin and Kapitsa on the feasibility of a nuclear bomb, Joseph Stalin reportedly gave his conclusion: “We should make one too”.

Head of LFTI Abram Ioffe, who is often dubbed the father of Soviet physics school, was offered to head the research, but he declined, saying he was too old for this work and suggested his apprentice Kurchatov instead.

Intelligence data played an important part in the atomic project, reducing the timeframe and giving scientists ideas on where their research should lead. Kurchatov routinely checked reports from agents on the “Project Enormous” as the American nuclear weapons research was codenamed, and gave his analysis to head of NKVD, Lavrentiy Beria, who supervised Soviet atomic effort. Some of the contributing informants remain classified, others like German-born British citizen Klaus Fuchs have been exposed as such. Fuchs spent nine years in prison for espionage before his release in 1953, and later immigrated to Eastern Germany.

The contribution which espionage played in boosting soviet nuclear research is debated, with some scholars going as far as saying the “Russians stole the bomb from Americans”. However most agree that it saved time, rather than opening a principle possibility of success. Atomic project was too complex and without talent and huge effort of researchers, engineers and workers, all the spying would not be enough.

German uranium and brains

Another factor that opened shortcuts for the Soviet Union in the nuclear project was the defeat of Nazi Germany.

For once, Germans facilities had large amounts of uranium, which Russians lacked. By the time the need for large amounts of the rare element was brought up by nuclear scientists, there was but a handful of uranium mines in Soviet Union, and exploration for new ones was time-consuming and chancy.

Most of uranium stored in Germany was salvaged by an American group, but some fell into the hands of the Soviets. According to Kurchatov, without uranium captured in Germany, the first experimental nuclear reactor he built in Moscow would have been brought to criticality not in February 1946, but a year later.

Not less important is that several leading German scientists and some 300 hundred specialists, who had been working on Third Reich’s own nuclear project, have been taken to Soviet Union. Nikolaus Riehl, a Russian-born German physicist, headed a uranium plant near Moscow, while famous inventor Manfred von Ardenne and Nobel Prize winner Gustav Hertz worked on isotope separation in Abkhazia. For their contribution many German scientists have been awarded by the government.

Crucial goal

Vladimir Kremlev for RT. Click to enlarge

After the United States used nuclear bombs against Japan in 1945, the need for Moscow to have the powerful weapon became as pressing as ever. A special governmental committee with virtually unlimited power was formed. It included top figures in the government, including Beria, a deputy chair of the cabinet Georgy Malenkov, ministers of economic planning, heavy industry and chemistry, and Kurchatov’ who headed all scientific research.

The committee and dist decisions were top secret, but they could draw and any material and human resources to reach their goal. It saved the atomic project from much of red tape. On the grimmer side, Beria relied on NKVD’s experience in using Gulag inmates in other projects. Many facilities needed to create the bomb have been built by political repression victims.

In addition to the atomic project the committee also managed research in rocketry and the creation of air defense system around Moscow.

In 1949, at least five years ahead of the earliest estimates of western nuclear experts, the country-wide effort yielded the long-awaited result. On August 29 the first nuclear bomb, the RDS-1 was detonated at the Semipalatinsk range in Kazakhstan.

First lightning

The bomb was placed at a 30-meter tower with dozens of military vehicles, brick and wooden buildings, fortifications and test animals placed around it at different ranges. There were even several tunnels dug underground to see how much they would be damaged by the 20-kiloton blast. The explosion was monitored by numerous cameras and instruments.

The radioactive fallout was registered by spy planes patrolling Soviet borders, and soon US President Truman was reported that the nuclear monopoly was no more. By that time former allies have turned into bitter enemies, and western generals were preparing plans for a possible new war – this time against the Soviet Union. Some plans mass bombing of soviet industrial centers with both nuclear and conventional bombs. The Cold War was in full swing and sliding towards a hot one.

The news that Moscow had nuclear weapons had a chilling effect, especially on European members of newfound NATO, who were obviously the prime targets for a nuclear strike in case of a war.

More successful tests followed the unexpectedly early breakthrough. Soviet scientists tested their first thermonuclear bomb RDS-6s in 1953 just a year after Americans tested their first device Ivy Mike. The layered design of was absolutely different and was later abandoned for the scalable two-stage bomb. On the other hand Make was a 62-ton proof-of-concept device, while the “Sloika” bomb, as it was called, was feasible as a weapon, which makes priority in H-bomb creation debatable.

As parties to ideological confrontation stockpiled more nuclear weapons they turned from devices of war into the best argument not to wage one. The superpowers had to negotiate.

Alexandre Antonov, RT