Published: 16 November, 2008, 17:23
Edited: 16 November, 2008, 17:23
This week we discuss Russia’s relations with the European Union. Is there a chance for a new partnership and cooperation agreement between the two anytime soon? Can there be a different approach to strengthening ties?
Peter Lavelle, RT's political commentator and anchor.
The Russia-EU summit in Nice France was not easy going, but it went nonetheless. There remain some fundamental differences separating the two sides. Shouldn't Russia and the EU lower expectations for a new partnership and cooperation agreement? Even if a new agreement is hammered out, getting all 27 EU to sign may be next to impossible. Wouldn't it be better to focus on a small number of issues like trade, energy, and even security? Until the EU has something approaching a coherent foreign policy, pursuing grand projects like a partnership is essentially a waste of time.
Andrey Liakhov, international law consultant, London.
The EU and Russia need each other and have much in common; however, they have different views on almost everything, including their respective neighbours, the economy, security, etc. This makes reaching agreement on almost anything quite complicated. The EU's narcissic opinion of itself as “an example to its neighbours” in combination with the lack of unity within the EU makes it almost an impossible partner to negotiate with at the best of times, let alone against the backdrop of the worst financial crisis in decades, the standoff over the “Georgian affair” and increasing demand for Russian hydrocarbons.
A reasonable question that is being mulled over by the Kremlin for some time is “why bother” talking to EU as a whole when better results could (at least in theory) be achieved by talking to individual members? The reasons for doing precisely that are complex, but what the ultimate principal driver of this seems to be is the growing recognition that the EU is clearly moving towards a single foreign policy and Russia believes that the earlier it engages the EU as a whole the more opportunities it will have to influence the EU policy mechanism and its substance.
Furthermore, having the EU as a whole as a party to a bilateral agreement inevitably means that all EU members will have to support it. This could create “partners by default” for Russia – i.e. because of a unified EU approach, countries even with the most hostile approach to Russia would have to behave in line with the agreed arrangements and if they try to go on a frolic of their own their ability to do so would be severely restricted by internal EU mechanisms (which should take some burden off Russian shoulders).
Setting up a general broad framework for cooperation should make deals on individual topics like energy and trade much easier to negotiate and implement. This is demonstrated by the history of the previous EU-Russia agreement. It must be said that the 1997 EU-Russia agreement was entered into with a substantially different EU, which, institutionally was much friendlier to Russia with much more de facto unity of foreign policy than the current 27 member organisation. Having said that, it seems that Russia has a fairly good understanding of what drives the foreign policy of the new members, particularly the Baltic States and Poland. Furthermore Russian foreign policy makers have already learned to work with the institutionally Russophobic Governments of the UK and Central Europe and, as the recent, quite chequered history of EU-Russia relations seem to demonstrate, are learning quite successfully to work round (or, in some instances to cut through) Russophobic tendencies shown from time to time by various EU members.
Negotiating the new EU-Russia partnership agreement will not be a walk in the park. Neither will it be a Cold War style protracted and often desperate negotiations. These are widely expected to be very bureaucratised, compartmentalized and dull, which will continue at a relatively low level for many months. The result is likely to be a very general framework agreement which will go very little beyond the bland general proclamations. Nothing much is expected, given the current bland state of EU-Russia relations and the internal EU discord on almost every issue of its foreign policy. However a bad agreement is better than no agreement and it will then be down to the art of diplomacy to use this per se useless instrument to try to build sound mutually profitable economic relationship with the EU.
Sergei Roy, editor, www.guardian-psj.ru
As we know all too well, talks on a new EU-Russia treaty, to take the place of the one unveiled in 1997 and expired in 2007, were cut short on September 1st in the wake of the August conflict in the Caucasus. This EU gesture was meant as “punishment” for Russia for what Western politicians and propaganda artists like to describe as the “Kremlin's aggressive foreign policy,” of which slapping down Georgia for its act of naked, genocidal aggression is apparently a vivid instance.
As punishments go, this one was a distinct, I’d even say resounding, flop. Russia’s FM Sergei Lavrov made it clear that Russia could jolly well do without a new treaty altogether, and there is a lot of sense in that. It is not easy to see how the absence of such a treaty could critically impact relations between Russia’s No.1 client and investor – namely, the EU, and the EU’s biggest energy source – namely, Russia. Particularly in times of global economic crisis, when markets are at a premium.
At the same time it is clear to both sides that hammering out such a treaty, or even setting up a format for discussing it over what looks like quite a long time to come (officials on both sides are talking of a two-three year time frame at the least), would be an advantage.
For Russia, that means that the original reason for the suspension of negotiations, this curious desire to “punish” Russia, has been put on a very distant back burner by its EU partners, or the vast majority of them. Diplomatically, this is, if not a victory, then a distinct sign of progress in relations. Nothing to be sneezed at, in these turbulent times.
By deciding to resume the treaty talks on December 2, the EU is clearly cocking a snook at the outgoing US administration, which still sticks to its nonsensical determination to press for an annulment of the results of the August conflict by forcing Russia to go back on its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and to withdraw its troops from these republics, stationed there at their request.
“We cautioned the EU and its member states about starting the partnership and cooperation negotiations in light of Russia not fulfilling the cease-fire agreement,” said U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Merkel in a statement to the press. This warning was clearly not heeded by the EU leaders. It was publicly resented by Nicolas Sarkozy, whose country holds the rotating presidency of the European Union.
Whatever they may be saying publicly, EU leaders have clearly made up their minds on the new situation in the Caucasus, accepted it as a fact of life – much like Russia has accepted the Kosovo situation – and are shaping their foreign policy accordingly.
Importantly, their decision on the resumption of talks sends a signal to the incoming US administration that the EU’s security concerns – political, military, economic – are not fully consonant with those of the current US policies.
This means two things at least. One: European leaders expect the new US administration’s policies, especially vis-à-vis Russia, to be different from America’s current, clearly unrealistic stance. And two: the new US president will find a new format for debating EU-Russia relations already in operation. He will have to take cognizance of it as a fait accompli and make proper adjustments to his own foreign policy in this area.
This will surely cramp America’s unilateralist style – but that’s what it has been asking for, for the longest time.
Eugene Ivanov Innovation Program Manager at InnoCentive (Boston). He also writes his own blog, The Ivanov Report
International treaties don’t define the quality of relations between countries. It’s the other way around: the better relations you have with your international partner, the easier it is to put together a solid, comprehensive treaty regulating these relations.
The 1997 Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement did not prevent Russia’s relations with the countries of the anti-Russia bloc within the EU (the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Baltic trio) to deteriorate to a stage of open hostilities. The Five-Day War in Georgia has obviously only added to bad feelings. Yet, the two camps had a lot of other reasons to hate with each other well before August 2008.
There is little reason to believe therefore that a new treaty, no matter how meticulously crafted, can change this equation. Does it mean that the negotiations aimed at reaching this new agreement make no sense? Absolutely not!
Russia and the EU have a plenty of subjects to talk about. Russia’s recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia along with its military presence in the Alkhagori region and Kodori Valley may seem like the only hot topic. But it’s hardly so. The EU is concerned by Russia’s policy to charge foreign airlines for flying over Siberia; high tariffs on timber exports is another serious problem. On the other hand, some European countries seem to take seriously Russia’s security concerns and appear to be interested in listening to details of the “new security architecture” for Europe proposed by President Medvedev. It is much easier for these countries to cooperate with Russia on these specific issues while being under the cover of ongoing negotiations of the new strategic treaty.
There is one more important, however tactical, aspect of the current relations between Russia and the EU. The recent spat over Georgia’s aggression in South Ossetia has clearly shown to Moscow that what is called the European “Union” simply doesn’t exist. In reality, this “union” is composed of countries that put their hostility toward Russia above their own national interests and countries that are willing to work with Russia despite disagreements over particular issues.
Leading the latter group of European countries in France. French president, Nicholas Sarkozy, makes no secret of desire to use his positive role in resolving the August crisis as a catapult to the status of the first-class world leader.
Recent weeks have witnessed a rapidly growing sense of trust and friendship in relations between Medvedev and Sarkozy. It is only in Russia’s interests to see Sarkozy, the rotating EU’s president, succeeding in his ambitious plans. Negotiating in good faith the new agreement, for which Sarkozy is responsible on the EU side, is a small price to pay for improving relations with Russia’s currently best friend in Europe.
Does Russia need the new agreement more than the Europeans? Perhaps, not. But let them recognize it first.
Joera Mulders, independent Russia watcher, Amsterdam
When discussing the EU-Russia relations, three aspects need to be distinguished; (1) a new Russia -EU agreement replacing the PCA, (2) the pan-European security agreement proposed by Medvedev and (3) the aftermath of the war in Ossetia.
In Nice both parties agreed to renew negotiations for a new EU-Russia agreement. We should, however, not see too much in this announcement. Wise men on both sides have drawn up reports that draw the same conclusions: Russia does not know what it wants from the EU and vice versa. Let us take a break and find out first.
Conservatism and distrust of Russia obstruct the EU in imagining a new relation with Russia. Russia on the other hand has been in a modus of change since 1987. It is used to thinking outside the box. Like a 21st century Dostoyevsky, Russia wants to philosophise with its European partners about European civilisation and Russia's role within Europe. Russia believes it can save Europe. This time the emphasis lies less on spirituality balancing rationalism, but on security aspects and a different kind of energy; gas. Russia wants to open its heart to Europe, but also threatens that if Europe would refuse the offer, Russia will move east. Such an emotional position is too unpredictable for EU's conservative policy makers.
Europe considers itself much too serious to philosophise. It wants a fully detailed agreement. At the same time the EU very well realises that both the European Union and Russia are not ready for an ambitious project. So Europe proposes their version of a good conversation; broadening contacts between citizens; in education, tourism and business.
The economic and security aspects of a new EU-Russia agreement are silently put on hold. This is not a bad development. The mutual agreement to take things slowly is much more valuable than the urge to rush into pompous but shallow declarations. Yet this cannot be the message that comes out of Nice. The media will likely spin such a message into a failure.
To the rescue comes the pan-European security agreement proposed by Medvedev. This proposal should be seen as an attempt to revitalise the OSCE, this time not on the basis of a brittle hope for east-west reconciliation, but as a product of east-west reconciliation; not an instrument to pressure Russia and other former Soviet states into reform, but a platform for equal cooperation.
The escalation due to the announced placement of US missiles in Poland and Russian Iskanders in Kaliningrad, has put pan-European security back on the agenda. “Old Europe” needs a mechanism to break out these bilateral actions and restore the dialogue. Recent events have eroded trust in NATO and the OSCE in European capitals. So Medvedev's proposal is suddenly met with more interest in certain circles. A summit is announced to be organised in the spring or summer of 2009; if only to give the public the signal that EU-Russia relations are proceeding.
Thirdly, there is the aftermath of the war in Ossetia. The trend is definitely positive. The EU has faced its largest fear: Russia invading one of the former Soviet Republics, and in the process Europe has learned that through dialogue it was able to stop the Russian army, at least that is how it is imagined. Medvedev and Lavrov after all have always denied any plans to take Tbilisi and unseat Saakashvili. This is not the moment to quibble. Sarkozy's triumph empowers the EU to step over its fears for Russia. Let us use the momentum.
Politicians cannot do this alone. Effectively, our task as individual citizens is to build the trust, with which the politicians can broker. So, visit Russia, learn the language, do business and philosophise!